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IV

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The case caption identifies all parties to this proceeding.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i).
ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the Deputies fail to timely file their grievance with the Utah County Career
Service Council within three months from the date of the occurrence as required by Utah
County Office of Personnel Management Rule and Regulation section VILE. 1.?
Statute of limitations questions are reviewed for correctness incorporating a clearly
erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual determination of when the Plaintiffs
should have known of their alleged legal injuries. Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, ^f 32.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and Regulations
(PRR). (Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . .
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council. The
employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three months from the
date of the occurrence . . .)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1991, Utah County Sheriffs Deputies Charles Martin and George Alexanderson
held the position of Shift Supervisor in the Utah County Jail. (R 1477 12) Mr. Martin had
worked with the Sheriffs Office since January of 1986 and was promoted to Shift
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Supervisor in June of 1987. (R 1477 3, 12) Mr. Alexanderson started with the Sheriffs
Department on February 8, 1988 and was promoted to Shift Supervisor in April of 1990.
(R 1477 57) In 1991, Deputies Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer, Rod Robinson and John
Gruenbaum were also Shift Supervisors in the jail. (R 1476 57, 58) John Carlson was the
lieutenant over the jail, supervising three jail sergeants, Lana Morris (Johnson) and Dixie
Jones (Brunson), (who supervised the Shift Supervisors) and Mike Pientka. (R 1476 52-54,
Exhibit L, R 850-852)

The Utah County Office of Personnel Management (OPM)

maintained job descriptions for Shift Supervisor and Jail Sergeant. (Ex 1A, IB, R 917, 915)
The Jail Policies and Procedures Manual promulgated by the Sheriffs Department(JPPM)
contained a duties explanation for Shift Supervisor and Jail Sergeant/On Line which
corresponded with the 1991 organizational charts. (Exhibits 1A, IB, G, L, R833, 850-852)
The JPPM regulates day to day kinds of activities in the jail. Jail Policies and Procedures
were operational and applied to the jail only. (R 1477 129, 130). JPPM Section 150
provided that promotion ofjail staff members would be based on the demonstration of merit,
specified qualifications and competitive examinations, and would be carried out rationally
impartially and according to the law. Section 150.02 provided that all staff members
desiring promotion in the jail would be subject to a written examination, oral interview,
review of evaluations and length of service. Section 150.02.3 also provided that the length
of time served will be a basis for eligibility for sergeant requiring three years of correctional
experience including one year as a Shift Supervisor. The OPM job description minimum
qualifications for Jail sergeant were four years of experience as a deputy sheriff or detective,
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POST certification, qualifying score on the sergeant's examination. (Exhibit IB, R 914)
In 1991, Utah County undertook a salary survey which was completed in July of that year.
The salary survey revised job descriptions after input from employees. (R 1476 42) The
salary survey consisted of all of the job descriptions that were developed. (R 1476 51)
While various sergeant job descriptions were provided, the salary survey did not provide a
job description for Shift Supervisor in the jail, which was eliminated. (Exhibit 4, R 910,
Exhibit 5, R 909) Pre-salary survey employment in the jail was on a career track basis. Postsalary survey employment in the jail was not. Because Shift Supervisors were intermediate
positions, not department-wide sanctioned and confined to specific areas with specific
needs, the position did not lend itself well to career opportunities and the Sheriff determined
it would be better if first line supervisors were all of the rank of sergeant. (R 1477 109-111)
The Sheriff, as a result, eliminated the position of Shift Supervisor, reclassifying Shift
Supervisors to corrections specialists. Promotions to sergeant were then made subsequent
to the reclassification under a competitive process.

(R 1477 112) The Sergeant/Jail

Operations post salary survey job description dated 12-23-91 was retroactive to July 22,
1991 when the salary survey was implemented and required as minimum qualifications
"Current POST Certification, Current CPR Certification, Requires BS degree and three
years job related work experience." (R 911-912, Exhibit 1C)
As a result of the reorganization in the Sheriffs Department after the salary survey,
the separate career path that had been pursued in the jail was eliminated.

Thereafter

sergeants could be assigned anywhere within the Department at Sheriff Bateman's
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discretion. (R 1477 124-126) In the 1991 sergeants' selection process, Mr. Alexanderson
was considered for training, patrol, operations, civil and corrections sergeant's positions.
Mr. Martin was considered for training and corrections sergeant's positions. (Exhibit O, R
856-860, 1477 113) The selection process for sergeants' promotions in 1991 consisted of
resume review and promotability assessments completed by all deputy sheriffs who were of
the rank of sergeant or above for each of the candidates who were qualified. (R 1477 114,
115) After the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated, Shift Supervisor experience was
no longer required for promotion to sergeant in the jail. (R 1477 140)
In December, 1991, Shift Supervisors Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks, and Patrol
Deputy Dennis Howard, were promoted to Sergeant in the Jail. Sgt. Pientka continued as
a Jail Sergeant. Shortly after the December 1991 promotions, Mr. Alexanderson transferred
to Patrol and Mr. Martin transferred to Animal Control. (R 18, 20, 21, 35, 74)
Mr. Martin did not believe Bonnie Herkimer was peace officer certified, and was not
sure whether Mark Binks was peace officer certified when promoted in 1991. He did not
believe Dennis Howard was Shift Supervisor for a year and did not have a college degree.
(R 1477 30). On paper Shift Supervisors were reclassified back to Corrections Specialists
or Deputy Sheriff III and then promoted after being reclassified. (R 1477 31). Mr. Martin
learned that Herkimer and Binks had been promoted to Sergeant when he saw them wearing
Sergeant stripes. (R 1477 32). Mr. Martin since 1992 applied for Sergeant positions four
times, the most recent being 1996. (R 1477 36). In the last two years before 1997 Mr.
Alexanderson did not participate in Sergeant's promotions as the Sergeant's promotions
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were in all likelihood were going to remain the Jail the rest of their career. (R 1477, 77-78).
Mr. Alexanderson alleged Mark Johnson was promoted to Sergeant in the Civil Division,
in 1990 or 1991, when he saw his Sergeant stripes. Rex Murdock in Animal Control was
promoted without any register or open test, Larry Patterson was promoted in October of
1991 to Sergeant in Emergency Management, Tom Wroe the County Fire Marshall, and
Kirby Packham were promoted to sergeant. Yvette Rice was promoted to sergeant in 1994
without open competitive testing. (R 1477 85-91) Mike Swenson was paid at a Grade 20
the same as Sergeants for supervising inmates on work projects.
Mr. Alexanderson tested for a Sergeant's position in 1993, Mr. Martin did not apply.
(R 1477 141, Exhibit 6). The Deputies were on the register for the December 1992 Jail
Sergeant position. (Exhibit 16 R 874). In December 1994 most eligible deputies requested
the Sheriff promote without testing. Mr. Alexanderson did not apply for this test because
he did not agree with it, Mr. Martin did and signed the waiver. (Exhibit I, R 836-837, R
1477 150-151). The Deputies participated in the 1995 Sheriffs promotional process.
(Exhibit 17, R 1477 151-152). Mr. Martin participated in 1996 but Mr. Alexanderson did
not. (R 900). The Deputies withdrew from the 1997 promotions. (R 1477 54, 889) On
December 17., 1996 the Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman and raised the following issues
with Sheriff Bateman in printed outline form. Shift Supervisors were promised sergeants
positions and should have been placed in sergeants' positions before subordinates had the
opportunity to test; Corporal's were promised upgrade to sergeant and were already doing
sergeant work; Shift Supervisors were asked to vote on accepting the rank of Sergeant
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without a related pay raise in a Shift Supervisor meeting; Mark Binks, Bonnie Herkimer,
Mark Johnson, and Art Adcock were grandfathered into sergeant's rank which should have
been the case until all Corporal's in good standing were upgraded; written Jail Policy
150.02(3)(b) mandated one year Shift Supervisor experience as a requirement for eligibility
for promotion to Sergeant; Corporal's were asked to stop wearing rank insignia thereby
negating promotions without cause; Subordinate's of those Corporals were then promoted
to ranking positions over the Corporal's; the Corporals were demoted without cause;
apparent discrimination towards Corporals doing identical job descriptions passed over with
bias possibly based on likes/dislikes, favoritism, religious intolerance, administrative
egocentrism, and undisclosed subjective criteria, or whimsical scrutiny. They questioned
whether other qualified personnel were considered when Yvette Rice was appointed. They
also alleged "inconsistencies" such as fluctuating eligibility requirements, promoting Yvette
Rice and Pat Wroe with the uni-division experience and not inter division experience;
supervisors telling candidates promotional lists would be active for one year from testing not
the end of one half year due to fiscal calendar year change; varying promotional lists with
varying candidate placement; perpetration of extreme ethical violations during testing. (R
791-792) Sheriff Bateman by letter dated December 30, 1996 responded to the December
17, 1996 meeting with the Deputies .

Sheriff Bateman said he found evidence of

dissatisfaction with departmental promotional policy that is consistent with the issues raised
under inconsistencies. (R 3 40-3 41)
The Deputies in January of 1997 filed a grievance with the Utah County Career
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Service Council(CSC). Pursuant to CSC rules the parties submitted Pre-hearing Outlines
for a Pre- hearing to establish ground rules, define issues, identify witnesses and ascertain
stipulations of fact. Utah County alleged the grievance was not timely filed in its Prehearing Outline. (R 78, 1422-1430) At the Pre-hearing the Council, without the benefit of
a formal motion from the County and/or briefing by the parties, requested the parties to
briefly address whether the filing of the grievance was done in a timely manner and whether
it should be heard. This question was addressed by the parties before the CSC along with
the merits of the case. (R 734-758) By letter dated April 7, 1997 the Council confirmed
the CSC's decision to proceed in hearing the Deputies grievance on April 23,1997. (R 821)
Utah County filed a formal Motion to Dismiss based on the Deputies failure to timely file
an appeal to the CSC on April 17, 1997. (R 1412-1417) The Deputies did not file a
response. At the April 23, 1997 hearing, the parties addressed the County's motion. After
argument the Council stated:
"The Council rules that it is timely filed. We want to be formally on the
record and we wanted the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date
for the filing was December 17, 1996. It wasfiled—itwas a 90 day period to
file and it was filed January 10th with Marilyn (inaudible) personnel director
so that matter is no longer at issue". (R 1476 33)
The CSC heard evidence and arguments in this matter on April 23, 1997 and May 29,
1997. (R 1476, 1477) The Council took this matter under advisement and by letter dated
June 30, 1997 ruled that the Deputies should not be reinstated to the rank of sergeant
because they never achieved that rank. The CSC, however, recommended that both be
promoted to the sergeants rank effective immediately, pay at the sergeants level retroactive
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to December 9, 1991 when the first promotions to sergeants became effective after the Shift
Supervisor position was eliminated and that the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in
December 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing. (R 1142, 1143) Utah
County filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in District Court on July 15, 1997.
Thereafter, the nDeputies filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the CSC decision was not a
final appealable order. (R 72) By Order dated October 27, 1997 the Court denied the
Deputies Motion to Dismiss, but remanded the case to the CSC for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R 118-120) The Remand Order included direction to the CSC. In
Part C of the Order it stated:
"That in connection with the entry of such findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the Council may among other things as it in its discretion may elect:
... v. Make such changes, additions or modifications to his decision as it may
deem necessary or desirable; and
vi. Do such other things and take such further actions as it may deem
necessary or desirable to clarify or enhance the record of the
proceedings for eventual review by this Court. (R798, 799)
Pursuant CSC request, the parties filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on May 8, 1998. On May 26, 1998 the parties filed objections to the others'
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 1205-1377) Mr. Ryan Beuhring's (the final
member who heard the evidence) CSC term expired at the end of June 1998. Mr. Beuhring
continued to serve on the CSC until his replacement was appointed in the fall of 1998, but
the CSC had still not issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 221, 222)
By Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, the CSC informed the parties to submit
briefs on this matter by November 20, 1998 in preparation for a closed meeting to be held
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on December 2, 1998 in order to have findings before the end of the year. (R 814) At the
request of Respondents, the deadline in which to file the additional briefs was extended to
the 22nd day of March, 1999. (R 784-788) Instead of filing an additional brief in March, the
Deputies filed an Objection to Filing Further Arguments in the matter. (R 1209) Utah
County's Memorandum addressing the merits of the case was filed March 22, 1999. (R
1204) By ruling dated November 22, 1999 the CSC ruled that this case should be heard de
novo in the district court. (R 1141) Utah County in response thereto filed a Motion to
Reconsider before the CSC which the Deputies opposed. (R 1159,1154) Without ruling on
the Motion to Reconsider, and pending the hearing of an Order to Show Cause on April 24,
2000 regarding compliance with the district court's remand order, the CSC issued a ruling
dismissing the Deputies' grievance as untimely. (R 1137, 1128) The Deputies objected to
the CSC April 27, 2000 ruling. The parties briefed and argued the Deputies' objection
which was sustained by the court on September 12, 2000. The court allowed the parties to
brief Utah County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (R 243) The Deputies for the first
time in briefing the Petition for Extraordinary Relief argued the discovery rule to support the
untimely filing of the Deputies' grievance. (R362) Briefing was completed April 13, 2001.
(R 479) The parties argued the case on July 27, 2001. (R 1433) By Memorandum Decision
dated September 27, 2001, the district court stated it accorded the Career Service Council
broad deference in its findings of fact, but will review the Council's conclusions of law for
correctness. (R 1460) The district court determined that the Deputies' claims were barred
as a matter of law by the statute of limitations. (R 1454) The court entered an order
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granting the Petition for Extraordinary Relief, reversing the Utah County Career Service
Council, and dismissing the Deputies' claim for failure to timely file their grievances before
the Utah County Career Service Council. (R 1462)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The decision of the CSC is reversible for an abuse of discretion under URCP
65B(d)(2)(A). The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the Deputies
for the review of county career service council decisions is not applicable. It is a standard
employed in extraordinary writs only when the writ would have the effect of circumventing
a statutorily prohibited appeal.
Utah County Personnel Rules and Regulations required the Deputies to file a
grievance with the CSC within three months of the occurrence of the grievance. The
Deputies failed to do so, and rely on the discovery rule to excuse their failure to timely file.
However, by the Deputies' and their counsel's argument and testimony, it is clear that the
Deputies knew or should have known of their cause of action when they were not promoted
to sergeant in December, 1991, that someone else was and the Deputies believed they were
the only ones qualified for promotion. The Deputies were on actual if not inquiry notice of
all the key facts when they found out they were not promoted. The Deputies had access to
all Personnel job descriptions and rules and regulations and all Sheriff Department manuals
in addition to participating in the promotion processes. The Deputies failed to pursue their
claim with reasonable diligence. The Deputies cannot place any alleged promise that it
would be made right within any limitation period upon which they could reasonably rely in
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not pursuing a grievance with in the limitation period. The Deputies do not allege any facts
relevant to a prima facie showing of misleading conduct or fraudulent concealment of key
facts-who was promoted, and whether they met minimum job qualifications.
The discovery rule, exceptional circumstances prong is not applicable as this case
does not concern the performance of a technical service by Utah County and the prejudice
to Utah County is greater than the hardships imposed by the application of the three month
limitation of actions.
Utah County is not estopped from claiming the limitation of actions as no promises
of making it right, or any promises of promoting the Deputies were made, if at all, during
or after a limitation period expired. Reliance on any such promise would be unreasonable
in any event as promoting the Deputies outside of a promotional process would violate merit
principles which require considering all qualified applicants for a promotion.
ARGUMENT
I

THE DECISION OF THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL IS REVERSIBLE
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION1
County's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is brought under Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure(URCP) 65B(d). It states in relevant part,
Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency
or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion... The Court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether
1

The arbitrary and capricious standard cited by the Deputies does not apply to this
case. The arbitrary and capricious standard and direct appeal provisions of UCA 17-334(1 )(d) were enacted April 30, 2001 after this case was appealed to the District Court and
were not argued by the Deputies below. See 2001 Amendment Notes to UCA 17-33-4.
11

the respondent has regularly pursued its authority."
65B(d)(4).

URCP 65B(d)(2)(A),

The Court must determine whether the CSC exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its
discretion. The Deputies claim that the CSC may be overturned only for a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion is an unwarranted, ill-advised extension of URCP 65B(d)2(A).
In Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 667 (Utah 1995), because UCA
§77-27-5(3) prohibits an appeal from Board of Pardon's actions the plaintiff filed an
Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to compel the State Board of Pardons to
advance his parole hearing date. The court in Renn ruled that
Because the legislature has directed that there be no right of appeal from Board of
Pardons actions . . . mandamus and certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a
statutory appeal. Nevertheless, where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion
and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, giving appropriate
deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of
Pardons, intervene to correct such abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary
writ. Id, at 683, 684.
Pursuant to Renn if an appeal is barred by statute, an extraordinary writ will only lie
where there is a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness
are flouted.
State v. Stirba. 972 P. 2d 918 (Utah App. 1998) cited by the Deputies is also similarly
limited. In Stirba, the state sought to compel Judge Stirba to order over $9,000 in restitution
to a crime victim. UCA §77-18-8-1 (2)(Supp 1998) precluded the state from appealing Judge
Stirba's restitution order and the court found that the state may not use a writ of mandamus
to circumvent this restriction. Stirba, at 920. The statement that an "abuse of discretion for
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writs must be much more blatant than the garden variety of abuse of
12

discretion featured in routine appellate review", citing Renn, Stirba, at 922, is limited to
cases where a writ is sought when an appeal is prohibited.
While the court in Stirba held that a simple mistake of law does not qualify as the
kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discretion necessary for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue,
the Stirba court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on the fact that
. . . this proceeding has the same characteristics and seeks the same review and relief,
as a statutory appeal from Judge Stirba's restitution order. Hence, to avoid
transforming this action into an impermissible appeal, we must deny the state's
request for Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) Writ of Mandamus... Based on our determination that
Judge Stirba [did not abuse] her discretion under Rule 65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with
our holding that the state's action is tantamount to an impermissible appeal, the
state's Petition for Extraordinary Writ is hereby denied. Id. at 923.
The court has only applied the gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard when
an appeal is statutorily prohibited. In reviewing this matter the court will engage in routine
appellate review. UCA §17-33-4(l)(d)(Supp 1996) states, "Notwithstanding the other
provisions of this subsection (1), a right of appeal to the district court under the provisions
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be abridged." The instant action is a statutory
right of appeal and the standard suggested by the Deputies is not applicable. This is
supported by the fact that oversight of an appointed, volunteer, lay body such as the CSC
should be more, rather than less, stringent to adequately protect the rights of the parties.
Neither the Stirba nor Renn provide any guidance or rules to define a gross and flagrant
abuse of discretion. The gross and flagrant abuse of discretion standard advanced by the
Deputies is also contrary to the clear language of Rule 65B.
A similar appeal of a CSC decision under URCP 65B(d)(2) was reviewed for an
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abuse of discretion.2 Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23(Utah App. 1991).
The Tolman court stated that an abuse of discretion
. . . is a legal term to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an improvident exercise of
discretion; an error of law. . . . An abuse of discretion therefore, is an act by a
tribunal, not a standard of review in and of itself. A reviewing court discovers such
acts by applying varying standards of review depending on the error alleged. . . .
If, however, a party claims that a tribunal has stepped out of the arena of discretion
and thereby crossed the law, we review using a correction of error standard, giving
no deference to the tribunal's legal determination. We give no deference to such
decisions because we are in as good a position as a tribunal to determine the law.
Obviously the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of discretion
as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting the law. In essence a reviewing court
never overturns a lower tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id, at
26, 27.
II

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review to be applied by the Court in reviewing statue of limitations

questions was recently stated in Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24, ^ 32, a case in which
opposing counsel was an attorney of record. Therein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the
discovery rule are questions of law which we review for correctness. See,
e.g., Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Svs. L.C. 2000 UT 84, ^[10, 12 P.3d
577; dinger v. Kightlv. 791 P2d 868, 869-70(Utah 1990). However, the
applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule also involves
a subsidiary factual determination—the point at which a person reasonably
should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury. This is a question of
fact. See, e.g., Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 902 P2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995); Andreini v. Hultgren. 860 P2d 916, 919 (Utah 1993) (The point at
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal
2

The CSC is not a policy making body entitled to deference. Utah County is the
body charged with the administration of the County Personnel Management Act. See
UCA 17-33-5, 17-33-7.
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injury is a question of fact.) Accordingly, we review for correctness
incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary factual
determination of when the Plaintiffs should have known of their alleged legal
injuries.
Ill

THE DEPUTIES FAILED TO FILE THEIR GRIEVANCE WITHIN THREE
MONTHS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH COUNTY PERSONNEL RULES AND
REGULATIONS AND IT IS THEREFORE BARRED
Section VILE. 1 of the Utah County Office of Personnel Management Rules and

Regulations (OPMRR) states in relevant part:
Any career service employee who has completed a . . . probationary period . . .
having a grievance over merit principles may appeal to the Career Service Council.
The employee must file a written notice with the personnel director within three
months from the date of the occurrence . . .
Filing the appeal with the personnel director within three months is a jurisdictional
requirement. In Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044 (Ut. Ct. App 1997) the court held
that a 14 day time limit to appeal a planning commission decision was jurisdictional, stating
that the City Council was without jurisdiction to consider a landowners appeal filed after the
14 day time limit expired. Similarly, an employee having a grievance over merit principles
must file a written appeal to the CSC within three months from the date of the occurrence
of the grievance. Failure to do so is jurisdictional.
The three month time limitation within which an employee must file their appeal to
the CSC commences when the grievance occurs.
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins to
run when the last event that will complete the cause of action occurs, and simple
ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent
the running of the statute of limitations.
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc. 920 P.2d 575. 578 (Utah App. 1996). In Doit Inc.
15

v. Touche. Ross and Company. 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court
stated applicable rules on when a cause of action accrues as follows:
Under Utah law, a statute of limitations begins to run against a party when the cause
of action accrues.... As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could
have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion....Once a claim
accrues, it may not be maintained unless it is commenced within the limitations
prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [Citations omitted]
In the instant matter, the Deputies grievance occurred when the promotion decisions
for jail sergeant were made in December of 1991 and subsequent years.

After the

promotions occurred, the Deputies had three months within which to file a grievance with
the CSC. The Deputies failed to appeal promotion decisions within three months of the
promotions, and they cannot be permitted to pursue such claims more than five years after
the 1991 promotions and outside of 3 months of any other promotions.
Since no promotion decision was made in the three months prior to January 10,1997,
when the Deputies filed their request for CSC review, the Deputies' claims are therefore
barred by the 3 month limitation of actions.
IV

IT WOULD BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO DETERMINE THAT THE
DEPUTIES DID NOT KNOW OF AND COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE
KNOWN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION WITHIN THE
LIMITATION PERIOD
Generally a cause of action accrues and the relevant statue of limitations begins to run
'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action... [and] mere ignorance of the existence of the cause of action does not prevent
the running of the statute of limitations'. However in certain instances the discovery
rule allows for the tolling of the statute of limitations'until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action'.
This court has recognized three circumstances where the discovery rule
applies: (1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of
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the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would
be irrational or unjust regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the
discovery of the cause of action.
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128, 1129 (Utah 1992).
"If the discovery rule applies, the applicable statute of limitations is held to have
commenced running only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known the facts
giving rise to the cause of action". Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575,
578 (Utah App. 1996). In order to consider the discovery rule, "an initial showing must be
made that the plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the
existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Warren
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992); Sevev v. Security Title Company,
902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995); O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139,
1144 (Utah 1991).
The limitation period is postponed only by the belated discovery of key facts and not
by delayed discovery of legal theories. To determine whether a plaintiff should have
discovered the facts forming the basis of a cause of action two concepts must be
considered, inquiry notice and reasonable diligence. Was the plaintiff on notice that
she might have a cause of action and if so was she reasonably diligent in
investigating the facts surrounding the loss.
As to inquiry notice, cthe test is whether the plaintiff has information of
circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry...
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him'.
Anderson, at 579.
To invoke the discovery rule, therefore, it is necessary for the Deputies to show that
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within the limitation period they did not know and could not reasonably have known that
they were not promoted in 1991, and that the promoted deputies did not meet minimum job
qualifications.
The Deputies advance the following in support of a finding that they did not know
or should not have known of the cause of action before December, 1996. The discovery in
December of 1996 of illegal testing activities. Sheriff Bateman's December 30th 1996
pronouncement that Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position. That the Sheriff had
acted on a false premise in every promotional testing process utilized by the Department
since the elimination of the Shift Supervisor rank, that Shift Supervisor was never a ranked
position. The Sheriff acknowledged for the first time in December 1996 that there had been
inconsistencies in the Department's promotional process. The Deputies were repeatedly
assured by Department management that they would be treated fairly as a result of the
reclassification of their positions and the Sheriff assured them that he would make things
right. The Deputies were urged by the Department to resolve their issues internally, feeling
considerable institutional pressure for them to do so. Unbeknownst to the Deputies until
December 1996, the promotion and eligibility requirements fluctuated widely and were often
disregarded by Department management. (Brief of Appellant, page 26, 27)
These considerations are simply not relevant to when the Deputies discovered the key
facts-that the Deputies were not promoted in December 1991 and that deputies not meeting
minimum requirements were promoted to Jail Sergeant in December 1991.
Anything concerning the fairness of the testing process, procedural irregularities
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or whether testing policies were followed is not relevant. A finding that the testing process
did not comply with policy would not result in the Deputies promotion to sergeant. Any
such finding would result in setting aside the promotion and conducting a new process
meeting required policies. This the Deputies did not request. They requested promotion.
The alleged irregularities are irrelevant as to whether the Deputies were the only qualified
deputies to be promoted to Jail Sergeant in 1991.
The discovery through Mr. Martin's conversation with Sergeant Morgan of alleged
testing improprieties concerned a non ranked patrol position and is unrelated to the Deputies
or the 1991 promotions. The date of Mr. Martin's conversation with Sgt. Morgan is not in
the CSC record. The Deputies alleged the date of this conversation for the first time when
this matter was briefed in the District Court. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996
"admission" to the Deputies claimed "inconsistencies" in promotion policy is also not
relevant to whether the Deputies should have been promoted in December 1991. Sheriff
Bateman's December 30, 1996 response was not in the record when the CSC decided this
matter. Sheriff Bateman's December 30, 1996 response was added to the record in June of
1998 over Utah County's objection after this matter was remanded to the CSC for Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R 815, 816, 794, 768)
The following alleged circumstances are also equally irrelevant to the question of
who was promoted to Jail sergeant in 199land whether they met minimum qualifications.
Discovering in the December 1996 letter that the Sheriff did not consider Shift Supervisor
to be a department wide rank or that they had not been given due credit for Shift Supervisor
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experience in past promotional processes. The Sheriff in the same letter advised that the
Deputies had been given consideration for their supervisory experience and would continue
to do so. Whether promotion or eligibility requirements fluctuated or were disregarded. The
alleged concealment of promotion registers. The registers have nothing to do with minimum
qualifications. The Deputies knew who was promoted and did not need the register to know
who was. Alleged assurances the Deputies would be treated fairly and encouraging the
Deputies to resolve their issues internally.

The alleged institutional pressure or

determination that it would be better for their careers to not rock the boat. Encouraging the
Deputies to apply for promotion. There simply are no facts alleged that have any relevance
to when the Deputies first discovered or should have discovered they were not promoted,
who was promoted, and whether the promoted employees met the minimum qualifications
for jail sergeant.
If the Court finds any of the above allegations relevant, the review of the record on
whether the Deputies made the required threshold showing before the CSC is problematical.
The discovery rule was raised by the Deputies for the first time in the District Court. At the
beginning of the April 23, 1997 hearing after Utah County's Motion to Dismiss was argued
by the parties the Council ruled
With regards to the issue of the timely filing of this particular grievance, the Council
rules that it is timely filed. We want that to be formally on the record, and we wanted
the reasoning to be on the record also. The trigger date for the filing was December
17, 1996. It was filed—it was a 90 day period to file, it was filed January 10 with
Marilyn (inaudible) Personnel Director, so that matter is no longer at issue." (R1476
33)
The Council also ruled in the June 30, 1997 written decision
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The Council would also like to reconfirm that we did not feel like this hearing should
be barred because of the timeliness of filing. We felt like your discussion with
Sheriff Bateman in December, 1996 was the date that should drive the time for filing.
You filed within ninety days of that date, therefore, we proceeded with the hearing.
The Deputies raise the discovery rule in an attempt for the Court to uphold the CSCs
decisions on other grounds. In light of the imprecise CSC findings, Utah County will
attempt to marshal the evidence in favor of a finding that the trigger date for the filing was
December 17,1996 and the discussion with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 was the date
that should drive the time for filing.
The Deputies' arguments at the Pre-hearing and April 23, 1997 hearings are not
evidence and should not be considered by the court in determining whether the record
supports a finding that the Deputies reasonably first discovered their cause of action on
December 17, 1996. Neither should the court consider the Deputies December 17, 1996
outline and the Sheriffs December 30, 1996 response thereto which were added to the
record over the objection of County after the CSC decision while this matter was on remand.
County nevertheless has marshaled these arguments and evidence if the Court finds them
relevant.
A.

EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THE DEPUTIES CLAIMS

Unless otherwise noted the following evidence/arguments were argued by the
Deputies or their counsel, or are from the Deputies' testimony.
Pre-hearing argument-The Deputies relied in good faith on the Sheriffs promises that this
would be made good, they believed their Sheriff when he said he would make it good on it
and handle it internally. (R 754) The reason it was not filed in 1991 was that some promise
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was given by the Sheriff that the matter would be taken care of, the last meeting they had,
the Sheriff said that when he said he would make good on it was in December of 1996, the
first time that he actually in writing responded and said he would not be doing anything (R
752, 753) The case concerns the 1991 demotion and the ongoing testing process and
inconsistencies that have occurred over the years. The Sheriff didn't respond at that point
negatively to our case. (R 751) The Deputies in the two years prior to 1997 were told to
bide their time that it would be made right. (R 751) In 1991 a salary survey was done. The
Deputies had to figure out for themselves that they were being disciplined and that took a
period of time. (R 744) The Deputies understood they had to go up their chain of command
and did not realize that they should go separately and file a formal grievance. (R 743) Their
understanding of the policy is that you go up the chain of command. They understood that
there's a process you do within before you go without. (R 743) The Deputies were unable
to determine whether the candidates had been certified as being eligible and in fact they were
not. When the register was subsequently formed, they were never given access to the
register. That was held in confidence by the Sheriff. It was never posted, nobody actually
knew where they were, where they placed on the register. When the Deputies filed this
grievance and requested documentation, the Sheriff did come forth and find the registers and
submit them to the Deputies. The Deputies were not able to gain access to the registers for
many years until the grievance was filed. (R 742, 743)
April 23. 1997 hearing argument - Sheriff Bateman made promises to the Deputies that
he would make it right, we can handle this internally, I'll make it right and give promises.
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(R 1476 14) The Deputies tried to be team players by believing the Sheriff when he says
he'll make it right. (R1476 15) The Deputies relied on his promises to make it right. (R
1476 17)

In December of 1996 the Sheriff indicated that if he could prove these

commitments had been made he would make the situation right. The Sheriff made the
commitment in his office that if he could find these commitments had been made that he
would make it right not only make it right in the sense of promote us to Sergeant (R 1476
22, 23) In December of 1996 Sheriff Bateman represented to the Deputies that he would
investigate their allegations and if he was able to determine their allegations were accurate,
he would do what he could to make it right. (R1476 26) December 1996 was the first time
Sheriff Bateman put in writing you are getting no relief. They relied on promises made by
Captain Quarnberg to them who was their superior. It's not quite right for the Sheriff to
come in here and wash his hands of the matter when the people below him and yet above
these Deputies make promises that they will be made right to appease them meanwhile the
clock is ticking. (R 1476 30) The Deputies trusted their Sheriff when he made promises
whether it was himself or through his subordinates who are their superiors that it would be
made right. (R 1476 31)
April 23,1997 hearing evidence - Sgt. Mike Morgan was supervising a number of people
in the jail division while a testing procedure was taking place for a lateral transfer from other
areas into patrol. An individual called him and asked him for input on questions he was
formulating for the test. The questions were given over the phone and Sgt. Morgan wrote
them down. After talking about the questions for some time and also about a specific
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candidate that Sgt. Morgan was supervising at the jail, the candidate's qualifications and
whether he would make a good patrol deputy was discussed. At the end of the conversation,
the individual said, "Well, I guess if you left these questions on your desk and somebody
walked in and happened to see them when you weren't in there, you couldn't be held
responsible for that." Sgt, Morgan responded, "Well, I'm not going to do that, and we went
on and talked about a couple of other things." After the conversation, Sgt. Morgan shredded
the questions. Sometime later on an unspecified date, Sgt. Morgan related the experience
to Mr. Martin in an attempt to persuade him that the testing procedures in patrol that Sgt.
Morgan had been involved in were one hundred percent credible, very objective and not
subjective in trying to secure certain people. (R1476 193-196)
May 29,1997 hearing evidence - In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was told
there were no more Shift Supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes were
made.(R 1477 17) The Department failed to establish eligibility lists or appointment
registers and make them available to applicants. Exhibit O, the 1991 sergeant register, was
never made public and the Deputies did not obtain it until they requested it of the Sheriff.
Nobody had any idea where they had placed on an eligible register. They had only seen it
in connection with the grievance. (R 1477 69) People have been promoted without there
ever being a register and positions were filled with a secret process. (R 1477 77) Over the
two years prior to 1977, Sergeant testing was exclusive to the jail and a jail only sergeant's
position. In approximately 1995 Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it
was unfair that he had to basically test again to try to regain the ground that he already held.
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Sheriff Bateman said he understood his position, but didn't agree with it and also said,
Go ahead and bide your time. If you want to test for a position that comes available
in another part of the Department, when that position becomes available you'll be
afforded the opportunity to test." And I was willing to do that. I was willing to let
the water under the bridge, you know, be under the bridge. I bided my time, I spun
my wheels for another two years. There were only two processes that took place in
1995 and 1996 and again, those were exclusive to the jail. The one in 1995 I did
participate in, the two I think that occurred in 19961 did not with the understanding
that when a position became available I would be able to test for it. (R 1477 78, 79)
Many of the registers are kept confidential. You can't get one unless you either
request to see it and again if I didn't get the promotion, I don't even want to look at the
register, that's just me. In numerous promotional announcements they say that the registers
will not be made available. They will be held in confidence.

(R 1477

81) Mr.

Alexanderson responded, when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint
"Because as I stated I tried to be a loyal employee I thought the Sheriff was doing the right
thing. (R 1477 98-99)
Evidence submitted after CSC decision while case on remand - On December 17, 1996 the
Deputies met with Sheriff Bateman to discuss long held concerns contained in an outline
(supra p. 6, 7) about promotions and possible corruption within the Department and
requested that the Sheriff investigate and provide the Deputies a remedy. (R 791, 792) In
Sheriff Bateman's response thereto he stated,
The issue of automatic advancement of Shift Supervisors is not warranted because
the position of Shift Supervisor was never a ranked position. It was rather a
temporary solution to supervision problems in limited areas of the Sheriffs Office,
primarily the jail. Shift Supervisors were allowed to wear corporal stripes as a way
of visually recognizing their supervisory status, but was never intended as the
creation of an office wide ranked structure. . . .
... Deputy in charge and Shift Supervisor experience have been considered as
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part of the evaluation process and will continue to be considered. . . .
I do find evidence of your dissatisfaction with departmental promotional
policy that is consistent with issues raised under "inconsistencies" . . .
... Inconsistencies have occurred, but only in an attempt to be as fair and
impartial as possible. Each time a promotional opportunity has been available, things
have been learned that I believe have allowed us to do a better job the next time. The
new process being put in place in 1997 will, I hope, establish a system that will
eliminate the past inconsistencies. (R340, 341)
The foregoing argument/evidence is deficient of any relevant facts supporting a claim
that the Deputies did not know or could not have known of the key facts - that they were not
promoted in December 1991, that someone who did not meet minimum qualifications had
been and the Deputies believed they were the only applicants meeting minimum
qualifications. The Deputies knew or were on inquiry notice of the key facts. This is amply
demonstrated by the following evidence/argument. Unless otherwise noted, the following
argument/evidence is from the Deputies and their Counsel.
B

CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT

Pre-hearing argument- The job description that we were holding, Shift Supervisor, was
attributed as Sergeant in the salary survey.(R 745, 746) The Deputies were left as Acting
Sergeants from July of 1991 to December of 1991. (R 745) The Deputies brought up their
complaint about the whole process or lack of process time and time again, (R 752, 753) The
grievance was made known to the Sheriff in 1991 by Mr. Martin. (R 751) Mr. Martin spoke
with the Sheriff on several occasions personally and wrote him a long letter in April of 1992
after it became clear what was going on. The reclassification of deputies was done in
violation of some policies and we couldn't understand why they were violating the policies.
Two of the Shift Supervisors that we served with were moved up to Sergeants rank. Mr.
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Alexanderson moved out to Patrol when it was made clear to him that he was not going to
be moved up to avoid the chagrin of having to go back on a shift. Mr. Martin went back on
a shift and had to train his new Sergeant. They brought in someone that was unqualified in
violation of some policies that we can show. (R 745, 746) In and around December of
1991 there were complaints that are documented.

Mr. Martin did not file a formal

complaint at that time as he felt that the situation was going to right itself as soon as the
promotions started to become consistent and/or recognized that we were the qualified
competent people logical for the next Sergeants positions, when in fact they started opening
up and changing the career ladder and doing some alterations that affected that whole
situation and that's when it started to become clear, and that's when in about April of 1992
which was four months from the promotions. (R 743, 744) The Sheriff was the only one
that could answer certain questions and he was on notice from the get go that they had a
complaint about the process. (R 743)
April 23, 1997 hearing argument- Mr. Martin was told he's not allowed to wear his
second stripe in December of 1991 the first he knew that he had been demoted.(R1476 15)
In December 1996 was when the Sheriff beyond the letter dated 1992 put something in
writing saying basically I'm doing nothing for you. (R1476 16) The Deputies were advised
the job they were doing is equivalent to that of a Sergeant however we are going to eliminate
the Shift Supervisor position and make Sergeants in those positions instead of taking the
Shift Supervisors competently doing the job. They said okay we're going to open it up to
eligible Corrections Specialists with other kinds of criteria with different backgrounds. They
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expanded the criteria for eligibility to get the Shift Sergeant position which was replacing
the Shift Supervisor position. We at the time didn't think that was fair, however it was not
portrayed to us as a disciplinary action. We said okay, we're going to reclassify everybody
and we're going to promote from the greater pool including some Correction Specialists.
I had real trouble with that at the time because here I was supervising and training and
evaluating and managing the Jail and watching over personnel and now I had to compete
against those personnel to get basically my old job back which was a Shift Supervisor now
Shift Sergeant position. (R 1476 18, 19) Mr. Martin made his dissatisfactions vocal to
Captain Quarnberg, the Bureau Chief, and Sheriff Bateman and wrote Sheriff Bateman the
letter. (R 1476 19) Mr. Martin was moved back onto a shift "Just take your rank you're
being absorbed back onto a shift" and at that time I thought that it was wrong because here
I had been doing the supervisory job for 4 lA years, there's no discernable difference in the
job description change, yet they are taking me out of the position absent disciplinary action
or any kind of rationale I could see. (R 1476 20) At the time Mr. Martin was disgruntled.
He was on a team and went along with it because he believed that because the policy said
that you needed a year as a Shift Supervisor to be promoted, any further promotions that
came down the pipe were going to be a shoe in because I was one of the only few people
who had Shift Supervisor experience. (R 1476 21, 22) Numerous statements were made
in Shift Supervisor meeting where there would be automatic advancement of the current
Shift Supervisors into the position of Sergeant. (R 1476 22) When promises were made in
Shift Supervisor meeting the Deputies were under the understanding quite rightfully that
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they were the only qualified individuals so that they were going to be the two made Sergeant
and they were not. (R 1476 28)
April 23, 1997 hearing evidence-By letter dated April 22, 1992 Mr. Martin raised the
following issues with Sheriff Bateman. Mr. Martin was troubled by his unreasonable
placement on the promotion list; the most recent promotional process was a popularity
contest based on perceptions about individual personalities and promotability instead of an
objective analyzation of day to day task accomplishments and true ability; the salary survey
showed that Shift Supervisors in the Jail were doing a job comparable to Sergeants in other
divisions and indeed attributed the Sergeant rank to the Shift Supervisor job description with
no significant alteration; all active Shift Supervisors should have been promoted to the new
rank automatically unless there was specific cause to revoke supervisory status; Shift
Supervisor Corporals who were not promoted were effectively demoted. (R 907) Mr. Martin
realized he actually had been demoted, lost rank, supervisory authority and apparently all
recognition received as a Shift Supervisor; in December of 1991 Captain Quarnberg told
him he placed second to the bottom on the final roster. He attempted to justify Mr. Martin's
low placement by saying that he was a worker not a leader. (R 906) He takes issue with the
promotion into a position over me of any line deputy he supervised and evaluated. His
experience as a Shift Supervisor (as established in Jail Policy and Procedure 150.02)
designates him as a more logical and qualified choice for the position of Jail Sergeant than
any line deputy without Shift Supervisor experience, irregardless of the recent promotional
assessment. His supervisory experience cannot be forgotten or trivialized and his promotion
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to Corporal was never rescinded and must be given due consideration in any promotional
process. (R 905) Mr. Martin could only surmise that he had been attacked behind his back
by someone or some group with enough administrative clout to influence the promotions
rather than strictly evaluating performances measured against standardized guidelines.
Perhaps his style of leadership, his feelings about politics, his religious beliefs, or any of the
million other subjective perceptions became part of the criteria for evaluating him. The
Sheriffs Department constantly changing promotional process was transformational and
whimsical not predictable and calculable; the promotional criteria and procedure are
changed so much and so often creating such disparity from one promotion to the next;
promotional ground rules constantly change, the Sheriffs Department needs standardization,
objective promoting, and to follow written policies.

(R 904) He lost earned rank,

recognition, authority and wage difference between Deputy and Sergeant. (R 903)
By letter dated April 22,1992 Sheriff Bateman replied to Mr. Martin's letter. Sheriff
Bateman responded that he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate.
Two promotion cycles ago he was approached in writing by all individuals eligible for
promotion at the time and under the auspices of the Deputies Association to eliminate the
objective and competitive process the Sheriffs Department was using. It was too stressful
and the applicants would rather the Sheriff just make the selections for the open positions.
Sheriff Bateman stated that the majority of those being considered for promotion have been
satisfied with the new selection process and absent feedback to the contrary he would
continue to honor the request to not use the more objective and competitive process used in
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the past. Sheriff Bateman invited Mr. Martin to work through the Deputies Association to
bring about a change if sentiments have changed. (R 908).
May 29, 1997 hearing evidence- In September or October of 1991 Mr. Martin was told
there were no more Shift Supervisors, to stay where you were until the actual changes were
made. (R 1477 17) At the end of December they came in with new job descriptions, now
you can stop wearing your two stripes and promoted Bonnie Herkimer, Mark Binks, and the
Deputies were absorbed back onto the Shifts. (R 1477 18) Mr. Alexanderson saw this
coming when they started talking about just promoting two Sergeants and made
arrangements to go to Patrol. Mr. Martin went back on a shift and trained his new Sergeant.
Mr. Martin was told off and on for months leading up to the point where they actually said
there are no Shift Supervisors. (R 1477 18) There is no discemable difference between the
functions of Shift Supervisors that they're performing and the Sergeants. (R 1477 19) It
was Mr. Alexanderson's understanding when the news first came that Shift Supervisor was
going to be eliminated that those who were serving in that capacity would be promoted to
Sergeant based on inseemingly assurances throughout the years that they had talked about
upgrading that position to Sergeant (R 1477 19-20) Dennis Howard a Patrol Deputy was
promoted and became Mr. Martin's Sergeant. (R 1477 21) According to the policies at the
time and the job descriptions we felt that we were qualified if not more qualified than Mark
Binks and Herkimer in as much that we were Peace Officer Certified. We were confused
because there was no testing. (R 1477 21-22) Mr. Martin understood the minimum
qualifications of the Jail Sergeant at that time were Shift Supervisor for one year, Peace
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Officer Certified and a college degree. (R 1477 22) He came to that understanding through
a job description outlined in the Sheriffs Department Policy and Procedure Manual (Exhibit
G) requiring Peace Officer Certification and minimum hiring requirements of the jail.
Exhibit G, a description of the minimum qualifications for the Jail Sergeant position at the
time that Herkimer and Binks were promoted as Jail Sergeants, was available to all officers
that were interested in being promoted to Sergeant. (R 1477 22,23) Mr. Martin understood
Bonnie Herkimer was not POST Certified at the time of her promotion as he remembers her
having to go to POST after that to go up and get her certification. (R 1477 30) Mr. Howard
at the time of promotion was not a Shift Supervisor for a year. (R 1477 30) Mr. Martin
learned Binks and Herkimer were promoted when he saw them wearing Sergeant's rank
around the time he was told vaguely in the control room he didn't need to wear his rank
anymore. (R 1477 32) Mr. Howard when promoted had not served as a Shift Supervisor
and was trained by Mr. Martin. (R 1477 33-34) In December Captain Quarnberg told Mr.
Martin I view you as a worker not a leader so you're not getting promoted to the Sergeant
positions. (R 1477 34) In April or May of 1992 Mr. Martin transferred out of the jail. He
was humiliated and wanted to get out of the situation. (R 1477 35) When the Shift
Supervisor position was eliminated Mr. Martin complained to his supervisors that what
about the policy that requires one year of Shift Supervisor experience which had not been
rescinded. At the time he went to his Sergeant. He said how can they do this. They are
eliminating our ranked position. They're going to put Sergeant's in the exact same position.
(R 1477 52-53) Mr. Martin has always had access to the Jail Manual and the Sheriffs
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Office Manual and the Personnel Manual. (R 1477 54)
Mr. Alexanderson testified in December of 1991 he was called into Captain
Quarnberg's office and told the promotion list is coming out tomorrow and you're not on
it. Prior to the time he met with Captain Quarnberg he expected to receive a Sergeant job
based on numerous assurances, commitments in Shift Supervisor meetings. (R 1477 58)
They all expected to become Sergeants after the salary survey. The job description was
rewritten. The job description remained the same only the title changed. (R 1477 60)
Bonnie Herkimer and Mark Binks were not certified peace officers when promoted to
Sergeant which he understood to be a minimum qualification.

(R 1477 61-63) The

Deputies submitted their letter and their resumes and basically thought "this is it the stripes
are coming - or the additional stripe is coming. We've met all the requirements, we've got
all the qualifications this is just something that is some sort of a requirement." (R 1477 64)
The Deputies were advised in the September 6, 1991 Shift Supervisor meeting that Shift
Supervisors had been eliminated, that everyone would remain where they were for the time
being. (R 1477 70, 109-111) Dennis Howard, when promoted to Sergeant in 1991, had
correctional experience, did not have a college degree and had never been a Shift
Supervisor. (R 1477 72) The same night Mr. Alexanderson was told he was not going to
be on the promotional list he was offered a patrol spot and snapped it up because he was
embarrassed, humiliated, had been promoted, had his rank revoked, reneged, negated
without reason whatsoever and opted to save a little bit of face when they offered the
opportunity and he got out of there and went to patrol. (R 1477 75-76) Mr. Alexanderson
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did not apply for Sergeants openings in the two years prior to 1997 because over the last two
years testing for the Jail position of Sergeant was exclusive to the Jail. The person being
promoted to the rank of Sergeant when the test was being administered by the Jail was in all
likelihood going to remain in the jail for the rest of his career. In a conversation in the two
years prior to filing the grievance Mr. Alexanderson informed the Sheriff that he thought it
was unfair that he had to test again to try to regain the ground he already held. Sheriff
Bateman said he understood his position, he necessarily didn't agree with it but he
understood it ( p. 24, 25, supra, R 1477 78-79) When Mr. Alexanderson was told he was
not going to be promoted he was floored, tears came to his eyes, he said thank you got up
and left. Since that time he's not been given explanations for not being promoted. Many of
the registers were kept confidential or you can't get one unless you either request to see it,
and again if he didn't get the promotion he didn't even want to look at the register. (R 1477
80-81)
When the deputies requested that Sheriff Bateman forego formal testing in 1994 Mr.
Alexanderson refused to sign the petition saying the testing should be waived. He didn't
think it was appropriate and instead of asserting his rights at that time he let it go. Mr.
Alexanderson responded when being asked why he waited five years to bring this complaint
I had conversations with the Sheriff indicating my displeasure at having to test to
regain the ground I had held in the Jail and I was willing to let bygones be bygones,
even to let my demotion go in order to be eligible to test when the position became
available in an area I was interested in up to 1996 and that's what the plan was. (R
1477 98-99)
Mr. Binks was in the Academy in 1991 and was told that he had made Sergeant a couple
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days before his actual graduation from the Police Academy. (R 1477 185)
Based on the foregoing facts any finding that the Deputies first knew or should have
known of their cause of action when they met with Sheriff Bateman in December 1996 is
clearly erroneous. By their own statements the Deputies were on notice of and felt that they
were clearly wronged by their reclassification to corrections specialist from Shift Supervisor
and failure to be promoted to sergeant in 1991. When they learned they were not promoted
in December of 1991, they believed they were the only qualified applicants for jail sergeant.
The Deputies participated in the promotion process and knew who was promoted. They had
access to all relevant Personnel, Sheriffs Department and Jail Rules, Regulations, Policies
and Procedures.
The Deputies were on inquiry notice as early as August 15, 1991 when Sheriff
Bateman, by memo notified all employees that all Shift Supervisors were to be eliminated,
that those filling Shift Supervisor positions would automatically be reclassified to deputy
Sheriff III or corrections specialist without an associated pay loss and that sergeants'
positions would need to be filled if the salary survey is implemented, would be open to all
eligible employees and any eligible employee would be required to submit a resume to be
considered. Exhibit 5. Shift Supervisors were notified on August 22, 1991 in a Shift
Supervisor meeting that the salary survey was placed on hold and it could not be adopted
until the County Commission approved it, but that the salary survey would most likely go
into effect the first of October or first of the year and that promotions would be held up
because of the salary survey, but that the Department would go ahead with promotion
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applications. Exhibit P. Captain Quarnberg advised all Shift Supervisors in a Shift
Supervisor meeting of September 6, 1991 that there were now no Shift Supervisors. Exhibit
B. Notice was given in the September 19, 1991 Shift Supervisors' meeting that the salary
survey was approved by the Commission. Exhibit C. Notice was given in the October 3,
1991 Shift Supervisor meeting that Personnel had the list ready to go regarding promotions
and that the list would be sent out to evaluate each person and start the interview process.
Exhibit D.
The Deputies were on actual notice of the facts forming the basis of their cause of
action in December 1991. At the very least the Deputies were informed of circumstances
sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry and did nothing for 5 years. There has been
no showing why the Deputies could not have discovered much sooner what they claimed to
discover from their meeting with Sheriff Bateman in 1996.
The Deputies claim that they did not learn of their grievance until their December
1996 meeting with Sheriff Bateman is unsupported. The Deputies' December 17, 1996
outline was presented to Sheriff Bateman in their meeting of the same date. The outline
raised most, if not all of the issues raised in this matter (p. 5,6, supra).
As evidenced by the December 1996 outline and Mr. Martin's April 1992 letter,
before the Deputies ever went to talk to Sheriff Bateman, they were on inquiry or actual
notice asserting most if not all of the claims brought in the instant matter. As argued above,
(supra,
u

p. 18-20) the

claimed

discoveries,

Sheriff

Bateman's

"admissions" to

inconsistencies"on December 30th, 1996, and the alleged discovery of testing irregularities,
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are not relevant or key facts. The Deputies complained about testing procedures far before
December of 1996 as evidenced by the complaints regarding testing procedures in Mr.
Martin's April 22, 1992 letter and Mr. Alexanderson's refusal to sign a waiver of testing
procedures in 1994. They were put on inquiry notice long before their meeting with the
Sheriff in December of 1996.
The Deputies discovered nothing in their discussion with Sheriff Bateman in
December of 1996 which they could not have previously discovered through the exercise
of reasonable diligence had they pursued their claims after the 1991 and subsequent
promotional processes. There is nothing in the record to show what key facts the Deputies
learned in or after their meeting with Sheriff Bateman, and why whatever is alleged to have
been learned in or after the meeting with Sheriff Bateman should not have been discovered
long ago through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Where the circumstances are such as to suggest to a person of ordinary intelligence
the probability that he has been defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits
that inquiry when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his eyes to the facts
which call for investigation, knowledge of the fraud will be imputed to him\
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah App. 1996)
Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Deputies could have and should
have investigated whether they were correctly reclassified to corrections specialists when
the Shift Supervisor position was eliminated, whether appropriate procedures were followed
in the 1991 and subsequent sergeants promotions and whether individuals promoted to
sergeant in the jail or elsewhere possessed necessary minimum qualifications. The Deputies
knew who was promoted and participated in the processes. The Deputies could have made
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a request under the Government Records Access Management Act for any documents
including eligibility and promotion registers they felt were necessary to their investigation.
Registers were not concealed as the Deputies did not request them. There is no evidence
that they requested registers and were turned down. They could have obtained copies of the
revised job descriptions containing minimum job qualifications. There is no claim that the
County concealed any of these facts from the Deputies. Everything necessary to pursue
their claims was known or easily available to them in December 1991. Mr. Martin, in his
April 1992 letter to Sheriff Bateman, refers to JPPM section 150, the very section the
Deputies claim was violated in 1991 and subsequent promotions. Exhibit 2. Yet no claim
was filed for more than 5 years. Certainly an impermissible time period given the three
month limitation of actions.
The Deputies as early as August of 1991 but no later than December 1991 were on
inquiry notice. Had they investigated the matter then as they did in 1996, they could then
have decided to bring a claim within the limitations period at a time when the memories of
the personnel director, Sheriff, and Sheriffs personnel involved in the promotion process
were fresh, prior to the loss of registers and documents used in the promotional process,
prior to memories fading, evidence being lost, and witnesses being unavailable. (R 1476,
145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174)
Because the Deputies knew of and should reasonably have known of the existence
of the grievance when they were not promoted, or on or before Mr. Martin's April 1992
letter, or two years prior to bringing the cause of action when Mr. Alexanderson approached

38

the Sheriff regarding Jail Sergeant promotions, the discovery rule is not applicable to extend
the limitation of actions from commencing in December of 1991. The same is true for all
alleged deficiencies in promotional processes or qualifications of candidates promoted.
Instead of pursuing their claims the Deputies chose to do nothing. They felt it better to not
rock the boat than to assert their claimed rights and having made that decision, cannot now
change their mind and attempt to revive long expired claims. Given the duty of inquiry, the
Deputies did not with reasonable diligence pursue their grievance
The Deputies failed to make the initial showing that they did not know of and could
not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim
within the three month limitation period. Having failed to make this initial showing, the
Court should not consider whether the discovery rule is applicable.
V

THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY
RULE IS NOT SATISFIED.
If the Court determines the Deputies did not know or should not have known of their

cause of action until December 1996, the Discovery Rule applies "where the Defendant
concealed the facts or misled the claimant, and as a result, the claimant did not become
aware of the cause of action until after the limitation period had run." Warren v. Provo City
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)
.. . The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. As is
true in all cases of equitable estoppel for the doctrine to be invoked, a showing must
be made that under the circumstances the party claiming estoppel has acted in a
reasonable manner. Therefore in order to invoke the concealment version of the
discovery rule, it must be shown that given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
39

plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period. Warren v. Provo
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992).
For the concealment prong of the discovery rule to apply, a plaintiff must "make a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier".
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578, 579(Utah App. 1996)
From the facts previously discussed there is no claim that the Sheriff Department
fraudulently concealed any key facts about when and who was promoted or what their
qualifications were. The Deputies were on inquiry notice and had access to all relevant
rules, regulations, policies and procedures. The Deputies simply cannot make the required
primae facie showing of fraudulent concealment of key facts.

For the discovery rule to apply

the Court must find that the Deputies did not become aware of key facts because of the
Sheriff s concealment or misleading conduct occurring before the limitation period ran. The
Deputies do not allege that any concealment or misleading conduct prevented them from
becoming aware of who was promoted or whether they held the minimum qualifications for
the job.
Defendant's allege that they were not given access to eligibility or promotional
registers. A review of promotional registers or eligibility lists is not relevant. There is no
evidence that the Deputies pursued the procedures and remedies available under GRAMA
to obtain copies of promotion or eligibility registers or that they even requested registers.
The Deputies had access to job descriptions, the JPPM, and the OPMRR, and could have
ascertained with reasonable diligence job minimum qualifications and whether the promoted
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sergeants met those qualifications.
The Deputies claim their inaction to be a result of assurances of department
management that they would be "treated fairly" and "things made right". The Deputies
cannot reasonably rely on the alleged assurances of Department management, (see argument
of Mr. Alexanderson at R 1476 22 alleging assurances made in Shift Supervisor meetings
in 1991) made before the 1991 promotions.

Sheriff Bateman had the final say in

recommending who would be promoted. Nor are any such statements identified as occurring
within the limitations period. Mr. Alexanderson argued at the April 1997 Pre-hearing and
later testified that Sheriff Bateman told him to bide his time and things would be made right
in the two previous years. This alleged statement did not occur within any limitations period
and cannot form the basis for a finding of fraudulent concealment, or misleading conduct.
The alleged repeated assurances that they would be treated fairly as a result of the
reclassification and that the Sheriff personally assured them he would make things right
concerned complaints the Deputies were already making and aware of. The allegations of
being treated fairly and make things right are also vague. Were these allegations made in
the context of promotions of the Deputies to Sergeant or the procedures of future
promotions? While the Deputies make vague allegations of repeated assurances of being
treated fairly and that the Sheriff would make things right, the evidence cannot place any
such assurances within a limitation period following a sergeant promotion. After the
Deputies were not promoted in 1991 the record contains only three communications between
the Deputies and anyone in Department Management. The first was April 22, 1992 when
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the Sheriff responded to Mr. Martin's letter of the same date. Therein (Exhibit 3) the Sheriff
told Mr. Martin he was not convinced that Mr. Martin's perceptions were accurate. There
were no promises of promotions, that things would be made right, or favorable treatment in
the correspondence. Exhibit 3 is a complete denial of Mr. Martin's April 22, 1992 letter.
The next conversation is detailed by Mr. Alexanderson. Around the 1995 sergeants
promotions he had a conversation with the Sheriff wherein the Sheriff expressed that he did
not agree with Mr. Alexanderson's representation that he was having to retest to regain
ground he already held. The Sheriff said he understood his position but did not agree with
it and advised "Bide your time and when an opportunity becomes available to test in another
area of the Department you'll be allowed to test." This was no promise of promotion or that
things would be made right. The third conversation occurred on December 17, 1996. The
Sheriff indicated he would investigate the Deputies claims and if he believed they were
meritorious he would do what he could to make it right. However this conversation
occurred far too long after 1991 or any promotion to have any effect on a limitation of
actions. The Deputies' claims of relying on repeated assurances of favorable treatment are
not reasonable in light of the foregoing conversations. In fact to do so would violate merit
principles by not considering all qualified applicants for a promotion.
5(3)(b)(xi)

UCA 17-33-

None of the conversations or alleged repeated false assurances can be

established to have occurred within any specific limitation period, nor had the effect of
concealing key facts or misleading the Deputies.
The Deputies claimed "institutional pressure" to resolve issues internally or their
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determination that they were unlikely to find promotional success if they were perceived
unwilling to work within the system does not amount to concealing or misleading conduct
preventing them from discovering key facts. Nor does urging the Deputies to apply for
promotions. Nor does a promise to treat them fairly or a promise of promotion. Nor does
the alleged fluctuation of promotion and eligibility requirements.
Reliance on concealment of promotion irregularities is unjustified. The Defendant's
participated in and were familiar with promotion processes or whether a promotional process
occurred and knew who was promoted.
The Deputies allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's
statements (R 1477 at 26), where he says that he never said that he would automatically
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476 132). Also
showing any reliance on alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr.
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in 1995.(R 1477 78, 79, supra p24, 25)

Besides

occurring long after and outside of any limitations period, the Sheriffs statements are not
a promise to promote, to make things right or an attempt to keep the Deputies from filing
their grievance.
The record does not contain facts sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of
fraudulent concealment or misleading conduct which prevented the Deputies from being
aware of key facts. There is nothing in the record to show that the County concealed facts
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or engaged in misleading conduct to prevent the Plaintiffs from discovering key facts or
sleep on their rights. The Deputies' failure to investigate is the only reason for any claimed
failure to discover.
No statements were made within limitations periods upon which the Deputies relied
in not timely bringing this matter before the Council. Even if such statements were made,
reliance thereon was not reasonable in light of Sheriff Bateman's April 22,1992 letter to Mr.
Martin and his conversation with Mr. Alexanderson concerning the 1995 promotions.
VI

THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY
RULE IS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
A prerequisite to the application of the discovery rule is ignorance by the plaintiff of
the facts giving rise to the cause of action. To invoke the exceptional circumstances
version of the discovery rule, the claimants must make a threshold showing that they
did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of a cause of
action. In fact, the requirement would seem a definitional prerequisite to reliance on
any version of the discovery rule judicial or legislative.

O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). If the Court
determines the Deputies did not know and could not reasonably have known of the existence
of facts giving rise to a cause of action, the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery
rule does not apply for the following reasons.
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule is applicable
. . . in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action."
Anderson v. Dean Whitter Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah App. 1996)
The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational
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or unjust is a balancing test...The balancing test weighs the hardship imposed
on the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations against any
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of time....Some factors
this court considers in applying this test include whether the defendant's
problems caused by the passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs,
whether the defendant performed a technical service that the plaintiff cannot
reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and whether the claim has aged to
the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the
parties cannot remember basic events.
Sevev vs. Security Title Company. 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). The alleged hardship
on the Deputies from applying the limitation of actions would be not promoting the Deputies
and the extra pay associated with a promotion. This hardship is somewhat minimized by the
fact that the Deputies did not participate in the 1997 and subsequent sergeant's promotional
process and Mr. Alexanderson did not test in 1996. The prejudice to Utah County resulting
from the passage of time is significant however. The Utah County personnel directors
County from 1991 through 1996 no longer work at the County. One has moved to Arizona,
the other retired.

Documents reflecting job announcements, promotional registers,

promotional tests and or processes no longer existed or could not be found. The County
introduced into evidence all documents found relating to Sheriffs Department sergeants'
promotions.

Documents which could have helped reconstruct the prior promotional

processes and especially the 1991 promotional process could not be found. Further, Sheriff
Bateman could not recall the 1991 promotional process, and neither could Lieutenant John
Carlson nor Captain Owen Quarnberg. (R 1476, 145, 146. R 1477 166, 167, 170, 174)
Utah County did not perform a technical service that the Deputies could not have
reasonably been expected to evaluate. The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery
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rule has applied in only two (2) cases since 1981. In Sevey, Security Title Company failed
to perfect a security interest in water shares and the water shares were lost. Sevey, at 636.
The second case, dinger v. Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990) involved a surveyor who had
negligently surveyed property. The buyers in that case had no reason to suspect that the
survey was inaccurate. The technical aspects of surveys and perfecting security interests are
not present in this case.
Because this case does not involve a technical service and the prejudice to Utah
County resulting from the passage of time outweighs the alleged hardship imposed on the
Deputies by the application of the limitation of actions, the exceptional circumstances prong
does not apply to extend the limitation of actions in this instance.
VII.

NEITHER ESTOPPEL NOR THE DISCOVERY RULE CAN BE RELIED ON
BY THE DEPUTIES
The concealment version of the discovery rule is essentially a claim of equitable
estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is
estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. Warren
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P2d 1125, 1129, 1130 (Utah 1992).
Under the Court's traditional analysis, to estop a party from claiming the limitation

of actions as a defense, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's action caused plaintiffs
failure to bring a timely suit. The elements of estoppel are
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not taken
on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; (3) injury
to the plaintiff that would result from allowing the defendant to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. S & G. Inc. v.
Intermountain Power Agency 913 P.2d 735, 741, 742 (Utah 1996).
Any such claim of the discovery rule or estoppel fails because "Utah recognizes the
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general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity." Weese v.
Davis County. 834 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 1992).
Any claim that Utah County is estopped from asserting the limitation of actions
defense also fails for the reason that the Deputies cannot point to any statement made within
the applicable limitations period for the 1991 or subsequent promotional processes upon
which the Deputies could reasonably rely in not pursuing their claims within any given three
month limitation period. Even if all arguments and evidence relevant to the limitation of
actions issue are considered, those arguments are insufficient to establish estoppel or support
the application of the discovery rule.
At the Pre Hearing opposing counsel alleged that the Deputies were made promises
that this would be made good, that it would be made good and handled internally, there were
repeated complaints to the Sheriff from the Deputies, that the Sheriff said he would make
good on it in 1996, and that the first time the Sheriff said he would do nothing was in
December of 1996. Counsel further represented that they were told to bide their time and
it would be made right, that they were given notice that further testing would be suspended
until this matter was settled. (R752-754) Argument at the April 23, 1997 hearing alleged
promises that the Sheriff would make it right, it would be handled internally, and that they
relied on promises made by Captain Quarnberg and people below the Sheriff that it will be
made right. (R 1476 14, 16, 17, 30).
Even assuming for the point of argument that these representations are true, the
Deputies can point to no statements made in the three months following the 1991
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promotions or three months following any promotions in which the Deputies were told that
this matter would "be made right or handled internally". The statements that this would be
"made good or made right" are vague promises upon which reliance would not be
reasonable. As Sheriff Bateman made final promotion recommendations, his statements
only could be reasonably relied on.
The representation that they were given notice that there would be no further
sergeant's testing until the matter was settled was in reference to the 1997 sergeant's
promotions in which the Deputies did not participate. The time frame of these alleged
statements is limited by other statements. At the Pre Hearing, Counsel alleges the Sheriff
said he would make good on it in 1996. (R754) At the Pre Hearing Mr. Alexanderson, said
"Promises were made by the Sheriff numerous times over the last two years." (R751) The
arguments of the Deputies are simply too vague to place a promise of the Sheriff within a
specific three month time period after a hiring decision was made. None of the alleged
promises to make it right or not promote until their issue was settled were not made until
1995 and 1996, even according to their allegations. This is far too long after the 1991
promotional process to have any effect in estopping the County from asserting the limitation
of actions contained in the PRR. Any reliance thereon would be unreasonable in light of the
time period which passed between the promotional processes and the filing of the grievance
in 1997 and also in light of the Sheriff Bateman's response to Mr. Martin's 1992 letter.
(Exhibits 2, 3).
The Deputies' allegations are further directly controverted by Sheriff Bateman's
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statements (R 1476, 26) where he says that he never said that he would automatically
promote the Deputies, but that in December of 1996, he told them if their allegations were
accurate, he would do what he could to make it right. Captain Quarnberg, said he was never
approached by the Deputies about why they were not sergeants. (R 1476, 132). Also,
showing reliance on any alleged representations to be unreasonable is the conversation Mr.
Alexanderson had with the Sheriff in early 1995 (R 1476 78, 79), where the Sheriff said he
understood Mr. Alexanderson's position, but didn't necessarily agree with it. There was no
promise to promote or make things right. In fact to just promote the Deputies would violate
merit principles by not considering all qualified applicants.
CONCLUSION
It was clearly erroneous for the CSC to find that the trigger date for purposes of the
CSC three month limitation of actions was the Deputies' December, 1996 conversation with
Sheriff Bateman. Based on their own statements, the Deputies knew or should have known
of their cause of action in December of 1991 when they learned they were not promoted.
There is no evidence to support a finding that Utah County participated in concealment or
misleading conduct preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts— that they were not
promoted and that someone else not meeting minimum qualifications was. The Deputies
cannot satisfy the threshold showing that they neither knew or should have known of their
grievance in December, 1996, or a primae facie showing of concealment or misleading
conduct preventing the Deputies from discovering key facts during the limitation period.
There are no circumstances in this case that warrant the application of the exceptional
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circumstances of the discovery rule. Estoppel is not available against Utah County and no
inconsistent statements were made within or outside of limitation periods upon which the
deputies reasonably relied in not filing the grievance within the three month limitation.
Based on the forgoing, the Court should therefor reverse the CSC and uphold the
decision of the District Court dismissing this action for the Deputes failure to timely file
their grievance within three months of its occurrence. In the alternative should the Court
find the grievance was timely filed, this matter should be remanded to the District Court to
consider Utah County's other significant arguments not presently before this Court.3
Respectfully submitted this 22 day of November, 2002.

M. CORT GRIFFIN
Deputy Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee Utah County

3

The District Court Order (which the Deputies did not object to) referenced only
the failure of the Deputies to timely file. Utah County was not required to appeal dicta
contained in the District Court Memorandum Decision. Other significant issues raised
below and unaddressed in the Memorandum Decision include whether the JPPM can
form the basis of an implied contract with a statutory employee, whether the disclaimer in
the JPPM prevents the Deputies from relying on the JPPM to form an implied contract,
whether the JPPM overrides Personnel job descriptions containing minimum
qualifications, or the effect of the elimination of the shift supervisor position and the
revision of job descriptions on minimum qualifications contained in outdated policies in
the JPPM to name a few.
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ADDENDUM
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lack of support for any political party, committee,
organization, agency, or person engaged in a
political activity.

E.

F.

5.

No officer or employee may engage in any political
activity during the hours of employment nor shall
any person solicit political contributions from
County employees during hours of employment for
political purposes, but nothing in this section
shall preclude voluntary contribution by a County
employee to the party or candidate of the
employee's choice.

6.

Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to permit partisan political activity of
any County employee who is prevented or restricted
from engaging in such political activity by the
provision of the Federal Hatch Act.

Appeal Procedure.
1.

Any Career Service employee who has completed a
Schedule B probationary period or a promotional
trial period having a grievance over merit
principles may appeal to the Career Service
Council. The employee must file a written notice
with the Personnel Director within three (3) months
from the date of the occurrence.
Procedures
outlined by the Career Service Council will then be
followed.
Exception: Career service employees
appealing discharge must do so within 10 working
days as outlined in this section (F.8.).

2.

The section regarding Constructive Discipline and
Appeal Procedure applies only to Career service
employees who have completed their probationary
period.
However, employees who are in a
promotional
trial
period
cannot
appeal
a
reassignment to their former grade and step.

Constructive Discipline and Appeal Procedure.
1.

The primary purpose of disciplinary action is to
change negative employee behavior. When discipline
can be handled in a positive manner, an employee is
less likely to feel hostile or defensive and far
more likely to make a serious commitment to change
behavior. The "constructive" approach to employee
discipline is fair and supportive, treats the
employee as a responsible adult, and allows him/her
to maintain self respect through the process.

2.

Over

the

years, a

PERSONNEL RULES AND REGULATIONS

set

of

generally

accepted
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